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Abstract: Decadence is typically associated with a fall from, or an opposition to, ideals of civilization.
Western Civilization traditionally traces its roots to the culture of Ancient Greece. While theorists of
periodicity from Vico to Nietzsche and Deleuze, to Hayden White and other contemporary scholars,
associate decadence with excess, artificiality and over-indulgence, they also recognize that decadence
often incorporates pre-civilized, base or “Other” tendencies. Paradoxically, decadence as a degeneration
of an original culture’s values can also rejuvenate that culture’s core values through mutation so that a
new version of the original culture arises. In literature, degeneration has also been associated with the
master trope of irony. Throughout ages when language fails to capture reality, or reality and ideals clash
in other ways, irony results. Self-consciousness, for example, is inherently ironic, and could be set in
contrast to “Golden Age” literature, in which master tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche
dominate. Perhaps one of the first instances of a decadent character in Western literature was Plato’s
Socrates, whose irony appears throughout the Dialogues as dissembling. If this is one of Socrates’ key
characteristics, could it be why philosophy has been categorized as pre- and post-Socratic? Here I
examine how Socratic irony relates to degenerative aspects of Greek society; better determine what we
mean by the “Western” tradition that is supposed to have begun during the fifth century; and suggest
that a society, a literature, or an individual must encounter an affirmative or positive irony to turn from
degeneration to regeneration.
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Daniel R. ADLER
Socrates the Degenerate: Irony as Trope of Decadence
Civilization and culture are two words thrown about so often in written and spoken language that it can
be hard to find succinct definitions for them. We all know what they mean, but to what, where or when
these concepts point is harder to define. One of the earlier theorists of social development, Giambattista
Vico, attempts this in The New Science, a meditation “on a science of the nature of the nations from
which their humanity arose, beginning everywhere in their religions and coming to completion in their
sciences, disciplines and arts” (4). Using Vico as a starting point, it becomes clearer what we mean by
culture, as that trajectory which begins in religion and comes to exist as a group of sciences, disciplines
and arts.
The Ancient Greeks, customarily taken to represent the origins of Western civilization, are as good a
culture to study as any, specifically with regard to the arts of what we today call poetry and philosophy.
The scholar Aaron Gare has noted that the formation of social institutions engenders a certain reflective
instinct, which in the case of Ancient Greek civilization, by contrast to other civilizations, allowed for the
specific choosing of institutions meant to uphold noble values (3). What were these noble virtues passed
down in Greek education? Or perhaps a better question is, what defines nobility as opposed to baseness?
Friedrich Nietzsche answers this question one way in Beyond Good and Evil, where he writes that
nobility has some fundamental certainty about itself, “something that cannot be sought, nor found, nor
perhaps lost. The noble soul has reverence for itself” (227). Thus, nobility can appropriate whatever it
deems good or noble. Gilles Deleuze, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, further defines Nietzsche’s nobility
as based on aristocracy, action, and affirmation, and opposed to negation of life and reactive ways of
being, which may manifest as cowardice, pain, weakness, accusation and resentment (119-20). Nobility
by necessity distinguishes and differentiates. Deleuze writes, “What Nietzsche often calls distinction is
the eternal character of what is affirmed…” (120). For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s differentiation is closely
aligned with taste, choosing, and interpretation. This does not preclude what is affirmed from changing,
however.
In Ancient Greece, paideia was a form of education based on cultivating this taste or affirmation; it
was a way to ready noble young men for war through physical training and the distinguishing of virtue
from vice. Gare points out how the art of Ancient Greek society—especially the tragedies of Aeschylus
and other early dramatists—exemplified the perils of fewer limits: paideia was a way of upholding those
limits and values agreed upon by previous generations (4). Paideia, then, has a dualistic nature as both
a set of limitations and impositions on noble nature, as well as a perpetuation of agreed-upon noble
values. The noble, active nature is constrained by culture, which, for Nietzsche, is simply “training and
selection” (Deleuze 133). While law-making, for example, is active, the following of laws is reactive.
Culture, or humanity acting on humanity, is the acting out of reactive forces.
As such, culture is represented by any collectivity; the church, state, races, classes: herds. Culture
primarily produces reactive states, not active individuals, and history, writes Deleuze, is a culture’s
record of how it maintains, preserves and organizes the reactive life (138-9). Yet this does not explain
how cultures change. For this, Deleuze considers an idealistic, post-historic realm where the product of
culture is the sovereign individual, the one who acts out reactive forces in his own way: “The finished
product of species activity is not the responsible man himself or the moral man, but the autonomous
and supramoral man, that is to say the one who actually acts his reactive forces and in whom all reactive
forces are acted” (137). The active individual opposes the herd, which in its striving to perpetuate its
values creates an obeying reactive man. In this striving, “Species activity in history is inseparable from
a movement which perverts it and its product…it is identical to a ‘degeneration of culture’” (138).
Continuous reactivity degrades those original values that the nobles perpetuated through paideia. Within
history, selective forces that perpetuate the species favor reactive man; the active man is more likely
to be singled out and not survive or carry on their supramoral values. From the active man’s perspective
culture is degeneration of the human species. From the perspective of culture, however, the active man
is degenerate for resisting culture, for being too noble.
Nietzsche’s Problem with Socrates
Deleuze writes obliquely about Nietzsche’s active men: Socrates, Christ, and Luther, how each bring
about the downfall of the golden age culture that came before them: Athens, Rome, the Renaissance:
“The genealogist is well aware that there is a health that only exists as the presupposition of the
becoming-sick” (167). The active man represents both this health and this becoming-sick: the former
as an individual, the latter as an embodiment of cultural decline. Recognizing that these active men are

Daniel R. Adler, "Socrates the Degenerate: Irony as Trope of Decadence"
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.4 (2021): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss4/5>

page 3 of 12

themselves the first symptoms of cultural decline, we could consider them inflection points of human
civilization, when the ascendant plot-line of culture peaks and changes direction. In The Birth of Tragedy
(1872) Nietzsche goes even farther—for him, Socrates is the single most critical point in history.1 And
while much has been written about Nietzsche’s complicated relationship with Socrates, Drew Hyland
argues that while Nietzsche’s views on Socrates in his later work do not remain identical with his early
work, they are consistent regarding how he changed Greek civilization (12).2 Michael Gillespie qualifies
this shift by describing how Nietzsche’s goal in Twilight of the Idols is to “…return to the eternal
idols…and subordinate them within his musical form, which is itself the form of life. In The Birth of
Tragedy, he argued that life was only justified as an aesthetic phenomenon; here he suggests that all
art and aesthetics is justifiable only as an expression of ascending life” (110). “The Problem of Socrates,”
then, begins with how Socrates, like all “the wisest sages” (Twilight 12), seems to be an expression of
descending life.
Socrates’ last words about owing Asclepius a cock, a common form of sacrifice for a cure, indicate
that he views life as an illness only death can cure. If Socrates was a life-denier, how could he be wise?
Nietzsche questions whether Socrates was in fact wise, whether all sages who have a negative judgment
of life are wise, and if wisdom implies decadence (Twilight 12). As Werner Dannhauser acknowledges,
it is possible to speak a truth despite being a decadent (208-9). But is Socrates’ statement about
Asclepius suggestive of truth? In the second aphorism, Nietzsche inveighs against value-judgments
about life: “Judgments, value judgments about life, for or against, can in the final analysis never be
true; they have value only as symptoms...such judgments are stupidities” (Twilight 13). But is it not
the case that Nietzsche, in calling judgments about life stupidities, is making a judgment himself? When
Nietzsche asks if all the great sages are decadents or declining types, as with many of his questions in
“The Problem of Socrates,” he is leading himself as well as the reader to a tenuous judgment, one that
does not have to be final, as we shall see by the end of this chapter, where Nietzsche revises and further
complicates his notion of Socrates’ decadence. As Gillespie notes, “Twilight, according to Nietzsche, is
neither a Yes nor a No to everything it considers; in fact it says nothing at all; it does not judge” (110).
Yet Twilight’s playful aestheticism does do much suggesting, even if it undermines or refines these
suggestions eventually. By ending this section with questions about whether all the great sages were
decadents, or were even wise to begin with, Nietzsche concludes by mentioning for the first and only
time, “the problem of Socrates.” Dannhauser writes, “The implication is that he means to show the
decadence of Socrates but not his lack of wisdom… He is wise because he quite possibly understood that
the value of life cannot be estimated, and that his valuations were a function of his own decadence. The
self-awareness of decadence is a kind of wisdom” (210). Thus it is possible for Socrates to be both wise
and decadent.
In the next aphorism, Nietzsche writes, “Socrates belonged, in his origins, to the lowest folk” (Twilight
13), as demonstrated by his ugliness. Later in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche writes, “Ugly things are
understood as signs and symptoms of degenerescence… A hatred springs up here: who is man hating
here? But there is no doubt: the decline of his type” (53). If the Greeks hated Socrates, it was because
he did not seem to them Greek enough. In a culture that associates beauty with the good, the noble,
and the ideal—these are just some of the connotations of the word kalos—for Socrates to be considered
wise indicates a revaluation of everything a good Athenian knew to be true; Socrates indicated a
separation of appearance from essence. A physiognomist arrives in Athens and, “…said to his face that
he was a monstrum—that he contained all bad vices and cravings within him. And Socrates simply
“Once we see clearly how after Socrates, the mystagogue of science, one philosophical school succeeds another,
wave upon wave; how the hunger for knowledge reached a never-suspected universality in the widest domain of
the educated world, became the real task for every person of higher gifts, and led science onto the high seas from
which it has never again been driven altogether; how this universality first spread a common net of thought over
the whole globe, actually holding out the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system; once we see all this
clearly, along with the amazingly high pyramid of knowledge in our time—we cannot fail to see in Socrates the one
turning-point and vortex of so-called world history. For if we imagine that the whole incalculable sum of energy
used up for this world tendency had been used not in the service of knowledge but for the practical, i.e., egoistic
aims of individuals and peoples, then we realize that in that case universal wars of annihilation and continual
migrations of peoples would probably have weakened the instinctive lust for life to such an extent that suicide
would have become a general custom and individuals might have experienced the final remnant of a sense of duty
when, like the inhabitants of the Fiji Islands, they had strangled their parents and friends—a practical pessimism
that might have generated a gruesome ethic of genocide motivated by pity…”
2
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for directing my attention to this article as well as a number of
others referenced throughout this and the following section.
1
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answered, “You know me, sir!” (13). But Socrates is a master of himself, he can contain all those
contradictory impulses, and channel all of his instincts into reason. In this sense, Nietzsche writes that
the equation “reason=virtue=happiness” (13), denies those instincts based on taste and differentiation
which noble Athenians relied upon. In the pre-Socratic world, authority was enough to give reason; it
came from within, “But the philosophers are the decadents of Hellenism, the counter-movement against
the ancient, noble taste (against the agonal instinct, against the polis, against the value of breeding,
against the authority of convention)” (78). In such a culture, to have to give reasons for oneself is a
show of weakness: “Whatever has to get itself proved in advance isn’t worth much” (14). The Athenian
noble, forced to justify himself to Socrates, to provide a definition to the question “What is…?” can be
easily confounded through logic and contradiction. This type of thinking was vastly different from a
reliance on the particulars of types, which, according to Nietzsche, was acceptable in noble Athenian
society before an era of sophistry. Socrates indicates a new taste—a taste against decaying noble
instincts, a capacity to contain his own base impulses through reason alone. Dialectic ignores the
question “Which one?” for the question “What is?” In the latter there is always posed an opposite quality
to that which is defined, which is essentially negative and reactive. For Nietzsche, the multiplicity and
typological differentiation which he associates with the noble taste of the pre-Socratic age is directly
opposed to the dialectical and oft-ironic mode of Socratic questioning, the move to reduce, define, and
contradict. This dialectical method that led Socrates to seem wise to the Ancient Greeks is also,
according to Nietzsche, what makes him unwise, or degenerate, for its overreliance on reason as
opposed to instinct. For Nietzsche, “To have to fight against the instincts—this is the formula for
decadence: so long as life is ascendant, happiness is instinct” (15). When life is degenerating, reason
must be used to pit the instincts against each other, to sort them. But when life is ascendant, it is
enough to follow instinct to be happy. As Walter Kauffman writes, defining Socratism as the outlook
Socrates embodies (399), “Socratism itself is decadent and cannot produce a real cure; by thwarting
death it can only make possible an eventual regeneration which may not come about for centuries.
Socrates himself realized this: “In the wisdom of his courage to die, he recognized that for himself no
ultimate cure was possible—except death (407).” Socrates is not a life-denier or nihilist as much as he
recognizes the formula that “reason=virtue=happiness” is a delusion, and that at least for him, death
is the only solution: “Socrates is no doctor...Socrates himself has just been sick for a long time…”
(Twilight 17).
The Paradox of Socrates
In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes how ascetic values are one way of fighting against the
instincts, how they can be a form of life-denial, depending on one’s type. Certain types can benefit from
decadence by pushing beyond the life-denial that can culminate in nihilism. As Nietzsche writes, “…man
would much rather will nothingness than not will…” (118). Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche defines how
the life-negating forces of dialectical reactivity can lead to nihilism, but nihilism does not have to end in
a will to nothingness. When pushed to its extreme, nihilism can become positive: “Reactive forces break
their alliance with the will to nothingness, the will to nothingness, in turn, breaks its alliance with reactive
forces. It inspires in man a new inclination: for destroying himself, but destroying himself actively”
(174). The will to nothingness succeeds and from it grows a will to power—a Dionysian affirmation, an
active destruction: “Negation sacrifices all reactive forces, becoming ‘relentless destruction of everything
that was degenerating and parasitical’ passing into an excess of life, only here is it completed” (175).
Deleuze writes that the one who seeks active destruction is not a nihilist, but rather a bridge to the
Overhuman, and in this sense wants to be overcome. If Socrates recognized in himself symptoms of
degeneracy—of instinct-denial and the inadequacy of reason as a means to happiness—then we can
interpret his drinking the hemlock as active destruction. Through this Deleuzian lens, Socrates’
statement about owing Asclepius a cock can lead us to read him as the first active man, as a bridge to
the Overhuman.
The paradoxical, duplicitous elements of active and reactive can apply to almost any term, including
degeneracy, which like terms such as culture, nobility and nihilism, can indicate life-denial for the
individual while being indicative of an affirmation for their culture at large—or contrarily, a denial of the
culture for the affirmation of the individual. Reading Socrates as the former can elucidate how Jacques
Derrida famously read Socrates as pharmakos, wizard as well as scapegoat, a gift as well as a poison,
a curse and a savior. Derrida cites the classicist J.P. Vernant in a footnote in “Plato’s Pharmacy”:
In the person of the ostracized, the city expels what in it is too elevated, what incarnates the evil which can
come to it from above. In the evil of the pharmakos, it expels what is the vilest in itself, what incarnates the
evil that menaces it from below. By this double and complementary rejection it delimits itself in relation to
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what is not yet known and what transcends the known: it takes the proper measure of the human in opposition
on one side to the divine and heroic, on the other to the bestial and monstrous. (131)

Socrates’ mode of dialectic and reliance on reason could be both what is “too elevated” as well as
the “evil that menaces it from below.” A way of approximating truth by ordering the instincts, reason
preserved Greek culture, even if it was delusionally predicated on being the only means to happiness.
Nietzsche recognizes this as he moves through “The Problem of Socrates.” He writes, “I have made
it understandable how Socrates was fascinating… (Twilight 15) and “I have made it understandable
how Socrates could be repulsive (16).” His tactics are not dialectical; Nietzsche demonstrates his
own instinctive line of reasoning, which is based in part on examining “The Problem of Socrates”
from multiple angles. Socrates could understandably be both divine and heroic, as well as bestial and
monstrous—his death represents an active and reactive moment for Athenian society and this
duplicitous interpretation is exactly what makes him so problematic for Nietzsche—on one hand,
Socrates is the beginning of the end for the Greek society Nietzsche so admires; on the other, he is
exemplary for an individualism grounded in degeneracy. As James I. Porter writes, “The point is not
just that Socrates can be said to be ambivalently admired or detested by Nietzsche—say, that he is
admired for some reasons and detested for others. It is that Nietzsche constructs Socrates as
despicable and admirable here for the very same reasons” (410). Socrates can be a contradiction, a
paradox and an irony, and Nietzsche’s many questions—often left answered—make understandable
this interpretation and encourage his readers to create their own.
As opposed to the dialectical manner of evaluation, Nietzsche’s interpretive mode is inherently fluid and
ironic—Alexander Nehamas goes so far as to call Nietzsche’s style “essentially hyperbolic” (31). He notes
that Nietzsche disdains the dogmatism of Socrates and Plato: “He wants to be believed, but not
unconditionally; even more, he does not want to appear to want to be believed unconditionally (33). To
read Nietzsche as Nehamas does raises suspicions about the truth-value of his hyperbolic claims, and
encourages re-reading and revaluation. The answer to “which one?” is always multiple, based on a
reader’s type, values, and ultimately, their nobility. And even if Nehamas’ claim about Nietzsche’s style
is itself hyperbolic, hyperbole can be classified as a sub-type of the master trope that Socrates came to
represent, and which Nietzsche imitates so well.
From Dialectic to Irony
The Delphic oracle’s prophecy about Socrates as the wisest man in Greece must have seemed strange
to Athenians. Socrates tried to prove the oracle wrong through his persistent questioning of those who
were supposed to be experts, his attempts to show that they knew more than he, but in doing so he
proved that they did not know what they professed to, and that at least he knew what he did not know.
Through dialectic, Socrates’ reputation for wisdom is based on knowing nothing. 3 By pressing for
reasoning, the dialectician allows the reactive condition of life to seem active. This seeming is a
revaluation that is inherently ironic—indeed, any revaluation is ironic, according to Hayden White’s
definition of irony, based “…in its apprehension of the capacity of language to obscure more than it
clarifies in any act of verbal figuration” (Metahistory 37). Such obscuring encourages active
interpretation. Could we not say that irony is, in a way, dialectically opposed to dialectic, its negative
counterpart, reveling in uncertainty and ambiguity as opposed to the hard definitions dialectic seeks? If
dialectic is a “symptom of decadence,” (Nietzsche, Twilight 8) then isn’t irony also? Perhaps we can
answer these questions by tracing the history of the term.
Originally a stock character in Aristophanes, the Eiron is one who dissembles.4 It makes sense that
irony would grow from Old Comedy, due to their close relationship. The Socrates Aristophanes depicts
in The Clouds is more comic than ironic, for example, in part because he is not the play’s hero. Driven
out of society, forced to jump out of the window of his burning school and chased out of town by stonethrowing slaves, Socrates is represented as pharmakos thirty years before he drinks the hemlock. But
See Plato’s Apology. 20d-23.
Gregory Vlastos notes that the first uses of eiron occur in Aristophanes, and later in the Sophist, when Plato
refers to sophists as impostors; that Socrates is depicted ironically in Xenophon’s Symposium; but not until Plato is
Socrates’ behavior defined as eironokos, translated as ‘pretending’. Vlastos also claims that from Plato’s depiction
of Socrates we come to our understanding of the word irony as represented by Quintilian: “that figure of speech or
trope in which something contrary to what is said is supposed to be understood,” (Vlastos 21) as opposed to what
in Attic usage equated to dissembling, and carried only negative connotations. While Vlastos explicitly treats the
term eiron and the change of its meaning from Plato’s to Quintilian’s time, here my concern is more with a more
general genealogical trajectory of the term, from its emergence and unprecedentedness to the repercussions of
seeing irony as a master trope, as representative of an era’s language.
3
4
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in The Clouds Socrates is an object of ridicule and a sophist, an alazōn, a blustering know-it-all. Northrop
Frye’s category of ironic tragedy designates the eiron, the one who pretends to know nothing, in
opposition to the alazōn (40). In The Clouds, for example, Socrates’ punishment outweighs his crime,
and this is funny. Frye calls this the comic counterpart to the irony of Plato’s Apology (46). There,
Socrates’ punishment outweighs his actions; tragic irony relies on the scapegoat, the pharmakos, who
is both guilty and innocent: “If there is a reason for choosing him for catastrophe, it is an inadequate
reason, and raises more objections than it answers,” (Frye 41). The difference between comedy and
irony depends on the gap between our reality and our ideal: in irony, it is greater because we have not
yet acted. Irony is only possible before action or knowledge, while comedy—laughter—comes after
action. In this sense, truth that comes too late is ironic. Henri Bergson further distinguishes irony from
comedy: “Sometimes we state what ought to be done, and pretend to believe that this is just what is
actually being done; then we have irony. Sometimes, on the contrary, we describe with scrupulous
minuteness what is being done, and pretend to believe that this is just what ought to be done; such is
often the method of humour” (40a). Frye calls Socrates’ trial and death tragic Dionysiac—the death of
a god. In Plato’s dialogues, with his philosophical father as protagonist, the reader enters into the realm
of “…ironic myth, a story of how the god of one person is the pharmakos of another…” (43). By martyring
Socrates over the course of his oeuvre, Plato’s fictional mode becomes increasingly ironic, as it allows
society to see itself in reflection. That is after all what the social gadfly does: present opportunities to
teach society about itself, to question basic values, especially those of haughty, pretentious alazōnes.
When the gadfly acts and it’s not funny, it is ironic for indicating the dawning of a realization, a truth
realized after illusion.
Socrates’ death is only another of his great ironies. To invoke Derrida again, we may better
understand how the pharmakon can be the ultimate irony, a total paradox—both and nothing,
embodying that which is and its opposite: “Conceived within this original reversibility the pharmakon is
the same precisely because it has no identity. And the same (is) as supplement. Or in differance,”
(Dissemination 169). For Derrida, the supplement or differance is the obverse of the term itself, and so
terms such as degeneracy, nihilism, and noble can mean their exact opposite under different
examinations. Nietzsche too recognized this irony—and in so doing, suggested: “It is a piece of selfdeception on the part of philosophers and moralists to suppose that they can extricate themselves from
degeneration by merely waging war upon it” (Twilight 15). Whereas for Nietzsche, a term can suggest
a multiplicity of meanings based on one’s perspective or type, Derrida seems to embrace a term’s
primary meaning and its opposing meaning. For Deleuze the multiplicity of a term’s meaning is based
on a process of movement, or rhythm. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s nihilism, for example, the
philosophers and moralists are not going far enough: they must push beyond the term itself into its
opposition: The only way to escape decadence is, ironically, to affirm it, to revaluate it—to become
decadent ourselves.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche does just that by defining the contradictory, duplicitous elements of
degeneration he embodies: “Looking from the perspective of the sick towards healthier concepts and
values, and conversely looking down from the fullness and self-assuredness of rich life into the secret
workings of the decadence instinct—this is what I practiced longest, this was my true experience; if I
became master of anything then it was of this” (8). Nietzsche goes on, after describing how he is
decadent, to describe how he’s not: he seeks pleasure only to the point of its being conducive,
distinguishes his own type from others, and easily lets go of what he does not like; he forgets (9).
Healthy and sick, decadent and affirmative—to assess how ironical Nietzsche is being here can perhaps
best be interpreted through his tone: that this passage comes so early in his parodic autobiography, in
the chapter “Why I Am So Wise,” indicates that there is truth in it, even if it is a truth that cannot be
pinned down. His movement from one pole to the other embodies the active destruction previously
defined; it is a way of not giving into nihilism or fascism, but a method of self-parody, self-overcoming
or self-mastery, so similar to that value of self-knowledge—also grounded in flux and change—which
Socrates held dear.
Irony in Phaedrus
Perhaps nowhere are Socrates’ attempts at self-mastery or self-knowledge better seen than in the
opening pages of Phaedrus. Here, it seems Socrates and Phaedrus are vying to out-dissemble each
other, and through their art of dissembling, they can better reach a semblance of truth. As soon as the
stakes of their meeting are conveyed—namely, that Phaedrus has heard a speech from Lysias about
seducing a good-looking boy by someone not in love with the boy, Socrates is interested in hearing it
too—both begin to play parts, using the logic of Lysias’ speech and applying it to themselves. Socrates
suggests that if such a way of thinking were applied to other speeches so that those traits typically
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associated with the common and the base are appealed to, then everybody would be better off, “Then
his speeches would really be sociable, and would serve the common good, (227d).” Here, Socrates is
clearly part of Nietzsche’s “rabble,” one of the common people, or so he wants to seem. On the other
hand, if Socrates is dissembling, he’s only playing the part of the rabble, secretly believing he’s not like
others, and making us wonder whether society would be better off if the weaker traits were appealed
to. In such a reading, Socrates would view Lysias as decadent, and so to get what he wants from
Phaedrus, he has to pretend that he is decadent too. This ironical reading is supported if we consider
that farther along in the dialogue, Socrates rebuts Lysias’ speech with his own, and differentiates himself
from others through his attempt at knowing, or mastering himself.5
“Everything in him is exaggerated, buffo, caricature…” Nietzsche writes (Twilight 11), and in the next
line this seems so: Socrates is so keen to hear Lysias’ speech that he’s willing to walk the twenty miles
from Athens to Megara and then back. Forty miles seems a bit far to walk for one speech. Phaedrus
thinks so; he replies, “My dear Socrates, what do you mean?” The “Dear Socrates” indicates that
Phaedrus could be dissembling for Socrates—doesn’t he know what Socrates means?—that Socrates
loves speeches? Phaedrus goes on, feigning humility, showering Lysias with praise, equating the value
of an ability to remember speeches with that of a pile of gold. We are now so deep in dissembling, with
Phaedrus waxing poetic about how he doesn’t know the speech, that for Socrates to one-up him, he
proceeds to tell a story about Phaedrus in the third person as if he didn’t know him—“I tell you Phaedrus,
if I don’t know Phaedrus, I’m a stranger to myself too” (228a). Under this pretext of false selfknowledge, the weight of self-consciousness here is nearly enough to collapse the whole edifice of
dissembling: Socrates repeats Phaedrus’ name as if to emphasize how well he knows him, alluding as
well to the oracle’s advice (also setting the stage to undercut himself later); the story he then narrates
describes how Phaedrus learned the speech, set out for a walk and met someone “sick with passion for
hearing speeches” (228b-c), which continues up to their present moment, where the speech-lover asks
him to repeat the speech and Phaedrus coyly pretends not to want to; finally, Socrates concludes by
asking Phaedrus to ask Phaedrus what he’s going to do. The doubling here only adds to the selfconsciousness and irony of this preparatory scene.
Phaedrus, caught out, admits what is “certainly true,” that Socrates won’t let Phaedrus get away
from him without at least trying to remember what he can of the speech, which Socrates accedes is
“quite right,” before Phaedrus goes on to admit that while he didn’t learn the speech by heart, he can
go through and summarize a few of the points. But Socrates, in his coup de grâce, points to what is
sticking out from Phaedrus’ cloak, the actual speech, the logos, the oft-noted phallic joke embedded in
the text. “Enough!” (228c-e) Phaedrus cries as he produces the speech. Did Socrates only just recognize
the speech poking out of Phaedrus’ cloak or did he know it was there the entire time, so that his
dissembling functions as a playful, if circuitous way of getting what he wants? Phaedrus then defers to
Socrates in asking where he wants to sit and read the speech, and the two walk toward the river and
the plane tree where the rest of the dialogue unfolds. Here, dissembling is a way of showing what is not
but what could be—intentions, desires, realities remain hidden, until negation and the oscillatory effect
of probing with questions and statements about claiming, remembering, knowing, and asking, bring us
to “actual fact” (228d). Socrates’ desire is the active one here in that it wins out—Phaedrus’ hopes of
using Socrates as a training-ground are dashed by Socrates’ dialectic and his irony.
Critics and philosophers such as Gregory Vlastos, Norman Knox and C.L. Griswold have worked to
differentiate and delimit the certain kinds of irony apparent in Socratic dialogues, such as in the above
scene. Gregory Vlastos has called such moments examples of “complex irony,” which is meant to “have
the effect of evoking and assisting their own effort at moral self-improvement” (32), where “they” are
Socrates’ interlocutors. Suspicions of Socrates’ meaning may lead “them” to accuse him of mockery,
though if Socrates is being mocking, it is unintentional until new evidence causes his interlocutors or us
as readers to revaluate his meaning. Griswold, on the other hand, while defining the dominant theme
of this dialogue as self-knowledge, focuses on the irony of Plato as author writing a dialogue about the
suspect nature of writing, calling this “Platonic irony” (13). A text that critiques the nature of texts
throws into question the nature of writing itself. Part of what enfeebles writing is its immutability, its
inability to respond dialectically. When Socrates compares painting and writing based on their silence,
Cf. 229e: “If anyone has doubts about these creatures and wants to use a rough-and-ready ingenuity to force
each of them to conform with probability, he’ll need a lot of spare time. As for me, I never have time to spend on
these things, and there’s a good reason: I still am incapable of obeying the Delphic inscription of knowing myself.
It strikes me as absurd to look into matters that have nothing to do with me so long as I am still ignorant in this
respect, so I ignore all these matters and go along with the traditional views about them.” This reliance on tradition
in the face of an inability to question the world outside oneself seems noble, in the Nietzschean sense.
5
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he says, “…you might think they were speaking as if they had some intelligence but if you want an
explanation of any of the things they’re saying, and if you ask them about it, they just go on and on for
ever giving the same single piece of information” (275d). A few lines later, when discussing whether the
written word has a “legitimate brother,” Socrates says, “It is the kind written along with knowledge in
the soul of a student. It is capable of defending itself, and it knows how to speak to those it should and
keep silent in the company of those to whom it shouldn’t speak” (276a). In this sense, only the student
with knowledge in their soul can use words legitimately, and such knowledge would allow that student
to interpret writing appropriately. Platonic irony tests students and weeds out those without the proper
writing on their souls by questioning the medium of writing itself. For those who have that knowledge
in their souls, the pleasure of a text lies in its interpretation, as long as it is beyond pure nihilism. As
Griswold writes, “Part of the ironist’s teaching may consist in the thesis that the irony itself, and so the
different levels of meaning and the relationship between them, is inseparable from the teaching in
question” (13). In this way, the ironic mode is similar to what we see in Ecce Homo: an irony that as a
style oscillates between sincerity and dissembling so fluidly that the difficulty of negotiating them is
exactly what makes texts such as Phaedrus a pleasure to read and re-read.
In “The Concept of Irony,” Paul de Man elucidates the power of this mood. He recognizes that irony
has traditionally been treated as a dialectic of the self, and that he himself has treated it in this way—
yet it is exactly this treatment he sets out to question. He moves through Fichte’s dialectic of the self in
order to describe Frederich Schlegel’s passages on irony, invoking “the lofty urbanity of the Socratic
muse,” as representative of “…the divine breath of irony. In such poems there lives a real transcendental
buffoonery. Their interior is permeated by the mood…” (177) [italics mine]. This is the mood we have
seen, an irony of permanent parabasis, where “…at all points the narrative can be interrupted” (179)—
that is, revalued, reassessed, or re-interpreted. The nature of irony—that it can mean the opposite as
well as any number of approximations of what might be intended—encourages interpretation, which is
one way to read Nietzsche’s unanswered questions in “The Problem of Socrates,” and his broader
project, as an alternative to dialectic.6 And while irony necessitates reason through its potentially being
taken at face value—a healthy skepticism can help a reader avoid falling into absurdity—only through
interpretation and subjecting language to an inspection of its transparency or obfuscatory power can we
come closer to the essence or truth of its meaning. Even so, meaning can be undone later; while other
philosophers of irony define the concept in its negative sense—in its attempts to move toward an
absolute—a more affirmative interpretation revels in irony’s heterogeneous, multiple revaluations of
meaning, and the settling of a singular meaning only upon a text’s completed reading. Such affirmative
interpretations arguably begin in an “active destruction” of a text’s meaning, in a desire to overcome
one set meaning with another. That is, coming to Phaedrus or any Platonic dialogue with a negative
conception of irony limits interpretations of the multiple ironies at play, and thereby limits the potential
for interpretations of the text. A negative conception of irony also prevents readers from seeing the
meta-irony of textual revaluation: that it functions in the same manner as personal revaluation, that is,
as inherent uncertainty about meaning because meaning can always change after what comes next,
that our self-knowledge is always in flux simply by the nature of our becoming. For example: once
Phaedrus reads Socrates Lysias’ speech, Phaedrus asks him whether it was not extraordinary. Socrates
replies:
Yes, it was out of this world, my friend. I was amazed. And you were the reason I felt this way, Phaedrus,
because I was looking at you while you were reading, and it seemed to me that the speech made you glow
with pleasure. Assuming that your understanding of these matters is better than mine, I followed your lead,
and so I came to share the ecstasy of your enthusiasm.
Phaedrus: Hmmm…does it strike you as something to joke about like this?
Socrates: Do you think I’m joking? Do you think I’m anything less than serious? (234d)

As we read, we might suspect as Phaedrus does that Socrates is not being sincere. And in a way we’re
right—on the next page Socrates critiques the speech’s content and its repetitions—but for now,
Socrates is being genuine, he’s not being anything less than serious, especially if we follow his reasoning.
He really does think the speech was excellent, but mostly because he’s watching Phaedrus enjoy it,
which must prove its excellence, in a way, at least. Socrates can be inspired like Phaedrus, not
necessarily by the speech written by Lysias, but by Phaedrus himself. This notion of inspiration relates
“Nietzsche creates his own method: dramatic, typological and differential. He turns philosophy into an art, the art
of interpreting and evaluating” (Deleuze 196). Cf. Derrida on Nietzsche, “Nietzsche never writes that x is
exclusively good or bad. Each entity is submitted to interpretation, this interpretation is an evaluation of what is
active or reactive (Negotiations 245).
6
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to how Socrates can disagree with the content of the speech, unsure which “skillful men and women of
old” (235c) would disallow him to agree with Phaedrus that it is in fact good content. Even though he
can’t remember how he was made aware of this, his awareness of his own ignorance leads him to
become conscious that he has been filled, “like a jug by streams flowing from elsewhere…” (235d). This
is not the only water imagery used in comparison to knowledge (or meaning or inspiration) in this
dialogue—and the meaning is clear: knowledge, meaning or inspiration can flow in and out of one as if
the individual were a vessel.
The irony flows on: Socrates tries to penetrate Phaedrus’ meaning about whether his “likeness in
beaten metal will be erected next to the offering of the Cypselids in Olympia” (236b), this the second
mention of a statue Phaedrus intends to dedicate to Socrates if he can add to the speech. Phaedrus then
accuses him, “…you have laid yourself open to the same maneuver you applied to me. You absolutely
must deliver the best speech you can, so that we aren’t forced to trade words in the vulgar fashion of a
comedy. Be careful: I’m sure you don’t want me to tell you things like, ‘I tell you Socrates, if I don’t
know Socrates…’ (236c)”. Phaedrus’ self-consciousness here verges on the comic, as he himself asserts;
what he is describing is both what he believes ought to be done and what is being done and concludes
with an imperative to hearken to what he says. But not until Phaedrus threatens Socrates with saying
exactly what will make him give the speech does he win. Socrates begs, “Then don’t say it!” (236d) but
Phaedrus will, even if he’s not sure which gods to invoke—itself a comic moment—why not; the plane
tree that is our current setting should be good enough: “Do you mind…?” Phaedrus asks. He goes on to
swear that if Socrates does not give a speech, he, Phaedrus, will give up speechifying for the rest of his
life. Socrates would suffer here, too, for he would never hear the beautiful Phaedrus recite any
speeches—which as he has noted, gives him great pleasure—though it is Phaedrus who would sacrifice
the most. Even though Socrates calls Phaedrus a “foul creature” (237a), a rather comical, exaggerated
insult, Socrates is clearly not the kind of person who would impose on his young friend such a
punishment, not if he can help it.
And so Socrates’ speech is framed rather self-consciously by a cunning man and a beautiful young
man (237b). He defines love, and breaks, again self-consciously, to ask Phaedrus if he thinks he’s been
inspired, before confirming that indeed, he has been: “It’s your fault. But listen to the rest of the speech.
After all, the fit might be averted, I suppose. But we had better leave this in the hands of the gods,
while we resume the speech to the boy” (238d). Socrates seems to oscillate between being impressed
at his own eloquence, wanting to continue, and wondering if he should or will stop before he gives
himself over to the gods. There is a sense here that Socrates is self-consciously losing himself in his
speech, aided by the divine power of the plane tree, the Nymphs, or another god. Before he continues
to meld with nature through his speech, this self-conscious break functions ironically, as if he were
working to overcome himself, with both Phaedrus and the gods aiding him. Here, Socrates is selfdenying without being nihilistic—Socrates actively proceeds with his speech without necessarily wanting
to, as if he senses that the results may not be entirely good.
By the time he’s finished his speech in defense of the non-lover, and “was about to cross the river”
(242b), Socrates recognizes his “familiar divine sign” (242c), which suggests he purify himself. Here,
the gods are again associated with the power of water, and Socrates’ internal voice leads him to conclude
that his speech was “awful and almost irreligious” (242d), that Phaedrus “bewitched” him into being his
mouthpiece, and that he has offended Love. Thus the stage is set for the Palinode. But before he begins,
Socrates asks: “Where’s that boy I was talking to before? I want him to hear the speech too before
rushing off to gratify a non-lover…” This is arguably the closest to a profession of love for Phaedrus that
we have seen yet from Socrates. By now we can re-interpret Socrates’ previous speech and his
admiration of Lysias’ as a product of his love for Phaedrus, both instances of giving in to appearance
over essence. Socrates has been filled up by Love, but it seems now he is ready to take on the full
responsibility for his palinode as indicated by his desire to leave his head uncovered (243b). That is,
until he clarifies, and says the previous speech he gave was Phaedrus’ and that the palinode he is about
to give is Stesichorus’, further absolving himself from potential censure (244a). Thus, following the
palinode, the rest of the dialogue is a way for Socrates to further approximate himself, and come closer
to understanding exactly what is at stake and what he means by speaking well and properly.
Our evaluation of Socrates’ meaning cannot be complete, then, until we have finished reading the
dialogue in its entirety. As the dialogue’s subject comes to revolve around what makes a good speech,
it’s clear that Socratic self-knowledge is turned not just upon Socrates himself or upon Phaedrus in its
various shades of gray, but ultimately on the reader to know themselves as interpreters of what Socrates
is saying. The critic Matthew Linck points this out by noting that irony functions in Phaedrus
retrospectively, but that, “We cannot allow the retrospective reading to cancel out the prospective
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reading” (267). This notion justifies how to read Socrates as a “dissembler” without finding ourselves
stuck in negativity.
Irony, or dissembling, is one way Socrates gives himself over completely to the immediate present,
and it does not preclude doubling back on itself. In many ways, such being is instinctive, and given to
self-overcoming. As Martin Heidegger puts it: “…metaphysics’ utmost entanglement in the inauthenticity
of nihilism comes to language in the desire to overcome” (231). Irony, while on one hand the trope of
language’s utmost negation, can also be the trope of language’s self-overcoming, the point where “…the
entanglement closes itself off from its own essence and thus, under the guise of an overcoming of
nihilism, transposes nihilism into the effectuality of its deracinated nonessence” (231). Socrates’ irony
uses nihilism as a negation, but a negation of what is not. This is how we can read Socrates sincerely,
moment by moment, as representing a nihilism that degenerates into affirming what is. Socratic irony
necessitates sincerity at its every stage, and in this way becomes affirmative because Socrates is never
entirely sure what he professes to be sure about, or if he is, he can always undo that surety on the next
page. While his dialectic is meant to reach a conclusion which can be upheld as truth, those conclusions
Socrates reaches with his interlocutors indicate a way of reasoning which can lead one to conclude a
truth that stands only in a particular moment, subject to later revaluation. To read Socrates as working
to know and discover or uncover himself is also to read him as one who is always becoming.
Irony as Ricorso
If irony is a tool to better understand the dialectic of the self and to self-overcome, it should work
similarly on the cultural level, from self-conscious reflection—active destruction and the beginnings of
decadence—into difference and the beginnings of regeneration. Within notions of culture, degeneration
and paideia, it makes sense that the only way Greek culture could have regenerated is through an Other,
and that Socrates, with his innovations of dialectic and irony, initiates this phase—is indeed a sort of
Other for the Athenians of his time. To consider Socrates’ irony as representative of the very beginnings
of a ricorso, rather than the depths of ironic barbarism Vico associates with the early medieval age, still
divided between a pagan and Christian paradigm (White, Tropics 214), is possible when we view him as
a critical point in Greek civilization, as its apex and the beginning of its descent. Vico writes: “Socrates
originates moral philosophy. Plato flourishes in metaphysics. Athens is resplendent with all the arts of
the most cultivated humanity” (47). But within two generations, Athenian supremacy will be undermined
and its culture will change drastically, in part through its spread by Alexander’s movement east.
Regarding the Persians, Vico writes: “Even Aristotle…writes that before that time the Greeks had but
told fables about them…In this way the Greeks began to have some real knowledge about the affairs of
other peoples” (47). Concrete knowledge of the Other furthers ironic self-reflection by allowing for the
revaluation and incorporation of elements of that Otherness. In this way, the incorporation of Other
values leads from the decadence of the primary culture to its regeneration defined by mutated or
adapted noble values. Thus, cultural irony signifies a dialectically generative form of decadence—the
movement beyond what is known into a new version of culture.
Irony signals the ricorso, the end of the progression that begins in metaphor, fables and myth, and
which progresses through the solidification of language in metonymy and synecdoche, and decays in
reflection and self-consciousness. As Vico defined it, irony is “…fashioned of falsehood by dint of a
reflection which wears the mask of truth” (131). This convolution is twice removed from truth itself: a
reflection wearing the mask of truth, an instability of meaning that never quite reaches truth—yet which
pretends to. Metaphor, on the other hand, though still with a core of self-consciousness, since
anthropomorphic subjectivity is its governing principle, is not self-consciously reflective, but uses the
self as a basis of comparison with an Other. If irony is the simulacrum, a double removal from an ideal,
metaphor is a turning away from the cave wall: a single removal from the model. Metaphor begins,
then, as soon as the primary culture recognizes the Other—and continues as the primary culture actively
destroys itself by incorporating Otherness in order to regenerate. The irony that leads to self-overcoming
or self-parody as exemplified by Socrates and Nietzsche can also be defined as the beginning of
metaphor: a comparison of what one was with what one is. C.L. Griswold recognizes that “A myth, unlike
a syllogism, has the capacity to act as a complex mirror in which people can recognize not just who they
are but who they might become at their best” (147). And interestingly, the prevalence of metaphor
increases toward the end of Phaedrus. The palinode’s myth of the soul; the myth of Theuth and Thamous
to explain to Phaedrus the dangers of writing, and how it can lead to “a spurious appearance of
intelligence” (275a); those original prophecies spoken by an oak which Socrates combines with an ironic
condemnation of “you young ones,” (275b)—which includes Phaedrus, who is more interested in
appearances than truth—to his anthropomorphism of writing, which he allegorizes with the metaphor of
a farmer sowing; to his recapitulation of the lessons of the dialogue and his final prayer, itself suggestive
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of the first stage of the Viconian corso, the age of gods. All of these metaphors attempt to undermine
appearance for the sake of essence.
In a world succumbing to base instincts, irony can be the beginning point for dialectic, as well as for
generative self-overcoming, on both cultural and individual terms. Whether these types of selfconsciousness may or may not indicate what we mean when we describe the Western Tradition, it’s
clear that thanks to Socrates they remain deeply influential today, despite Nietzsche’s attempts to
proliferate multiplicity and interpretation as an alternative to dialectic. Yet Nietzsche’s interpretation and
Socrates’ dialectical irony are not incompatible: For Nietzsche, both determine existence: the knowledge
drive, as represented by Socrates’ rational legacy, and the metaphorical, creative drive as represented
by his own taste for multiple interpretations (McCarthy 245). The former leads to the destruction of
illusions and the latter generates them, creating a cycle that is necessary for humanity: “The world of
consciously formed illusion is the world of happiness” (246). If the knowledge drive is a product of
dialectic and the creative drive a product of irony, to lose the former is to dwell purely in instinct,
characteristic of the archaic age preceding Socrates; whereas to lose the metaphorical, creative capacity
is to lose value in one’s life, to stop creating and give in fully to decadence and nihilism in their negative
sense, without ever going far enough to turn them into affirmation and regeneration. There is overlap
too; the one yields to the other, and the cycle begins again.
While I have focused largely on Nietzsche’s point of view of Socrates from his late career, it’s clear
that from his earlier texts Socrates is not Nietzsche’s enemy, or that even if he is, Nietzsche rejoices in
having such a strong opponent. In Human, All Too Human, written ten years before Twilight of the Idols,
he writes: “Socrates excels the founder of Christianity in being able to be serious cheerfully and in
possessing that wisdom full of roguishness that constitutes the finest state of the human soul. And he
also possessed the finer intellect” (332). Even in Beyond Good and Evil, published two years before “The
Problem of Socrates,” Nietzsche suggests that, “…among men of fatigued instincts, among the
conservatives of ancient Athens who let themselves go—toward happiness... irony may have been
required for greatness of soul” (138). Irony is what unites these two thinkers, although that may often
be overshadowed by how their other modes of thought differ—dialectic requires an interlocutor, and
interpretation does not. This fundamental difference plays itself out through their respectively ironic
deaths—to use Frye’s terminology, whereas the former’s is high mimetic—Socrates the hero—, the
latter’s is low mimetic—Nietzsche, poor Nietzsche.
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